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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No:  02-2515
BALLO BAMORY,
          Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES;
JAMES W. ZIGLAR,
          Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A-73-518-030)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on March 31, 2003
Before: MCKEE, SMITH, COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed April 4, 2003)
OPINION
    1  Although our Automated Information Management System, which governs case
captioning, refers to petitioner as “Ballo Bamory,” the briefs and record before the Court
indicate that his name is “Bamory Ballo,” and we will refer to him as Bamory Ballo.
2
SMITH, Circuit Judge
I.
Bamory Ballo1 appeals from the May 17, 2002 order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (hereinafter “BIA”), affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his applications
for asylum and withholding of removal.  The BIA sustained Ballo’s appeal with respect to
his request for voluntary departure, and Ballo does not seek review of that decision.  The
petition for review will be denied.
Bamory Ballo is a native and citizen of Ivory Coast.  Ballo testified that he is
Muslim and that his hometown of Anyama is predominantly Christian.  Ballo, along with
two other individuals, formed a religious group in Anyama called “Explosif,” which
advocates changes in the interpretation of the Koran that are contrary to the traditional
practice of the Muslim religion.  Ballo testified that at an Explosif meeting in Anyama in
June 1990, “the police came to look for and take the heads of the group Explosif,” and that
he fled when the police arrived.  After staying in a stranger’s home temporarily, Ballo
returned to his own home and remained there for a few days, without incident.  He then left
Anyama to stay with his grandmother in Gagnoa, another town in Ivory Coast.   Two weeks
later Ballo received a letter from his father informing him that the two other original
members of Explosif had been captured by police:  one was dead and the other was
3imprisoned.  Despite this news, Ballo remained in Gagnoa for approximately nine months,
from June 1990 to February 1991.  He then left Ivory Coast, but returned to Anyama in
September 1992.  After a fellow member of Explosif was arrested and he heard that the
police were pursuing him as well, Ballo left Anyama.  He then obtained a visa and traveled
to the United States. 
Ballo arrived in the United States on December 16, 1992 as a non-immigrant visitor
for pleasure with authorization to remain for a period not to exceed six months.  Ballo
stayed in the United States beyond June 16, 1993 without authorization from the INS.  In
fact, Ballo lived in the United States for four years and applied for asylum only upon arrest
by the INS.  On October 24, 1995, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause, charging Ballo
with being deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter “INA”)
section 241 (a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(1)(B). 
At a June 6, 1996 hearing before an immigration judge, Ballo admitted the factual
allegations against him and conceded his deportability.  On December 19, 1996, Ballo
testified at a hearing in support of his asylum application.  The immigration judge found
Ballo deportable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of deportation, and
voluntary departure.   Ballo sought timely review by the BIA.  The BIA conducted a de novo
review of his claim and issued an order on May 17, 2002 dismissing the appeal in part and
sustaining the appeal in part.  The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of asylum
and withholding of removal, but granted Ballo the privilege of voluntary departure. 
Whereas the immigration judge had based his decision on an adverse credibility finding, the
4BIA concluded that “even assuming the truth of his testimony, which is consistent with his
statement attached to his written asylum application, we would agree with the Immigration
Judge’s conclusion that the respondent has failed to establish eligibility for asylum or
withholding of deportation.”  A.R. 2-3.  Ballo timely appealed the BIA’s decision.
II.
Because Ballo first applied for asylum prior to September 30, 1996, the
immigration judge had subject matter jurisdiction under former sections 1158 and 1253(h)
of Title 8 of the U.S. Code (1995).  See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (hereinafter
“IIRIRA”), Section 309(c)(1)(B) (in the case of “an alien who is in exclusion or deportation
proceedings as of the effective date of the statute . . . the proceedings (including judicial
review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments”).  The
BIA had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(2) (1995).  This Court has
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order pursuant to former section 106(a) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a).  See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1059 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
cases where the initial deportation order was issued before September 30, 1996 are
governed by former section 106(a) despite its repeal).
III.
On appeal, Ballo challenges the BIA’s determinations that he failed to demonstrate
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he did not meet the
5standard for withholding of removal.  Because the BIA’s conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence, we will affirm. 
An alien is eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum only if he is unwilling to
return to his country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a).  The burden to prove a well-
founded fear of persecution lies with the applicant, who must demonstrate that he has a
genuine fear of persecution, and that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
similarly fear persecution if returned to the native country in question.  See Gao v.
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  An applicant who establishes past
persecution, however, benefits from a presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.  See, e.g., Obianuju Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116, 126-27 (3d Cir.
2002).  
Withholding of removal is available under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3) (2000).  This section provides that the Attorney General may “not remove an
alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); 
Obianuju Ezeagwuna, 301 F.3d at 127.  The burden on the alien to prove eligibility for the
non-discretionary withholding of removal is higher than the standard for a well-founded
fear of persecution – there must be a “clear probability” that his or her “life or freedom
6would be threatened.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1059 (3d.
Cir. 1997).  Accordingly, an alien who fails to demonstrate eligibility for asylum also fails
to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal.  Janusiak v. INS, 947
F.2d 46, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1991).
As the resolution of these factual determinations has been delegated to the BIA, our
review is circumscribed.  We limit our inquiry to ensuring that the BIA’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence.  See, e.g. Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (“Whether an asylum
applicant has demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is
a factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”); Abdille v.
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”  Obianuju Ezeagwuna, 301 F.3d at 126.  We may reverse only
where the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to that of the BIA.  Abdille, 243 F.3d at
483-84.
At the outset, we agree with the BIA that, even assuming Ballo’s testimony is
credible, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the BIA’s determination that
he did not suffer past persecution.  In order to show past persecution, an asylum applicant
must establish “(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is
‘on account of’ one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the
government or forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.” Gao v.
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Navas v. INS, 930 F.2d 784, 786 (9th
7Cir. 2000)).   This Court has stated that “persecution is an extreme concept that does not
include every sort of treatment that our society regards as offensive.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).  The treatment Ballo experienced in his hometown of Anyama
clearly does not meet this standard.  As the BIA noted, “[t]he record reflects that the
respondent was never arrested or harmed by government officials or anyone else while
living in his homeland.”  In addition, Ballo offered no testimony that he received direct
threats from anyone – he merely heard through others that the police were looking for him. 
The most the record reveals is that police were looking for Ballo, which he apparently
construes as a threat, but this does not constitute persecution.  The record establishes that
Ballo remained in Ivory Coast without incident for nine months after his friends’ arrests,
albeit not in his hometown of Anyama, and that he returned to Anyama despite the fact that
police were looking for him.  There is no evidence in the record that would compel us to
disturb the conclusions of the BIA with respect to past persecution.
Ballo’s claim that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution if he is returned
to Ivory Coast also fails.  After reviewing the record, the BIA concluded that “[a]lthough he
may subjectively fear being persecuted in the future based on his religion and association
[sic] his religious group (“[E]xplosif”), the evidence presented does not establish that his
fears are objectively reasonable. . . .”  A.R. at 2-3.  We agree.  Given that Ballo lived in
Gagnoa for at least seven months without incident after the police in Anyama started
looking for him, we cannot conclude that his fear is objectively reasonable.  In addition,
Ballo voluntarily returned to his hometown of Anyama in 1992 to reform the Explosif
8party, which undercuts his claim that he will be persecuted upon his return to Ivory Coast. 
We also note that Ballo did not apply for asylum until he was arrested by the INS after
having lived in the United States for four years.  
Furthermore, Ballo fails to establish that any perceived threat he might face upon his
return to Ivory Coast is national as opposed to local.  See Etugh v. INS, 921 F.2d 36, 39 (3d
Cir. 1990) (no prima facie case for asylum where applicant “failed to allege that he would
be persecuted beyond the limited vicinity of his hometown . . . . The scope of persecution
[he] alleges is not national. . . .”).  Ballo’s testimony establishes, at most, a local dispute
with a Muslim leader and the police in his hometown of Anyama.  See Petitioner’s Brief at
3 (Ballo fears he will be targeted “by the police of his town”); Petitioner’s Brief at 4
(claiming petitioner refused to cooperate with “the local police force”);  A. R. 137 (When
asked “did the police look for you anywhere else?,” Ballo responded, “Yes, in Anyama.  But,
I don’t know if – I did not know if they had much [sic] search in any other part of the
Country.”).  There is no indication that, should Ballo return to another part of Ivory Coast,
he would be subject to any threats of harm.  
A July 7, 1997 letter from the Department of State to the Immigration Court
regarding Ivory Coast stated that “there is no evidence members of Islamic associations in
Cote d’Ivoire are experiencing particular political problems.  The most recent census in
Cote d’Ivoire indicated that 44 percent of the population is Muslim.” A.R. 209.  “Mere
membership in or affiliation with an Islamic organization in Cote d’Ivoire,” the letter
continued, “is unlikely by itself to be the basis for persecution by the government.”  Id. 
9Based on this evidence, we agree with the BIA that Ballo has not established by objective
evidence “that the threat of persecution exists, if at all, on a country-wide basis, or that he
could not avoid being persecuted by relocating to another part of the country.”  A.R. 3. 
Given the foregoing, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the BIA’s
determination that Ballo did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution.
We find no evidence in the record that would compel us to reverse the BIA’s
determination that, having failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, Ballo has similarly
not met the standard for withholding of removal.  We agree that he has not shown that it is
more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in Ivory Coast on account
of his association with Explosif.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review of the May 17, 2002
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/ D. Brooks Smith
Circuit Judge
